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Commentary

Negative Duke D225G/N Death Data Raise Concerns
Recombinomics Commentary 21:20
February 14, 2010

a study done by the WHO Collaborating Centres for Reference and Research on Influenza (WHOCC) in Atlanta located in the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) found the D222G substitution in 14 virus isolates but not in viruses in the original clinical specimens indicating the D222G substitution in these 14 virus isolates occurred after growth in the laboratory.

The above statement is from a WHO preliminary report on HA D225G (D222G in H1 numbering).  Like virtually all main points in the paper, the interpretation of the sequences is at odds with the actual data.  This report is misleading and should be updated with current information.  The points made in the original report raise serious questions on the ability of WHO and consultants to interpret sequence data. Their efforts to support their outdate paradigm of random mutations continue to imperil the world’s health.

Recently released sequences by the CDC of a fatal Tamiflu resistant H1N1 cluster at Duke Medical Center are among the examples of detection of D225G and D225N in virus grown from clinical samples.  However, most examples of D225G and D225N are present as mixtures in original samples.  The failure to detect D225G and D225N in the original sample is easily explained by a lack of sensitivity in the initial sequencing.

In the case of the Duke samples, four partial HA sequences were released by the CDC. All four sequences had a wild type receptor binding domain as well as a rare marker Y233H.  The sequence from the original sample from a fifth collection was conspicuously absent.  Three of the five cloned sequences had D225G or D225N, including two samples from with same patient which had both.

The source of the partial HA sequences is unclear.  Each is listed as “original”.  Most of the examples of D225G, D225N, or both markers have come directly from autopsy samples, showing that the changes are not due to growth in the laboratory and also showing that the RBD changes are frequently present as mixtures, either between one virus with D225G and another with D225N, or mixtures of an RBD change and a wild type sequences.  Since the RBD changes can affect tissue tropism, samples from nasopharyngeal swabs or other locations in the upper respiratory tract may have low levels of virus with these changes.

This possibility is supported by the sequential samples from one of the patients.  The sequence from the virus grown from the initial sample had a mixture of D225G and wild type, while the subsequent sample was reported as D225G only, indicating the ratio of D225G to wild type was increasing with time.  The sequence from the second original sample was not released.

However, many labs, including the CDC, have released sequences from original samples that had D225G or D225N.  In the first series of CDC sequences from Ukraine the two novel samples had D225N and both were from original samples (and one of the two sequences was a mixture with wild type).  Similarly, sequences from Ukraine released by Mill Hill also came from the original lung or throat samples and had D225G, D225N or both markers.  D225G and D225N in sequences in original samples have been released by labs worldwide, including those in Brazil, Mexico, and Russia.

Thus, the strong linkage of D225G and D225N with original samples from fatal cases supports the presence of both markers in the fatal cases at Duke, which was further supported by the detection of these changes in three of five samples.

WHO and the CDC have failed to provide evidence that the D225G substitution occurred after virus growth in the laboratory.  Similarly, the frequent detection of both markers in samples from fatal cases in Ukraine and Russia invalidates the additional comments in the WHO report indicating that D225G was not clustered in time, space, and phylogeny.  Moreover, the attempts to discount the positive data detecting D225G and D225N by citing the negative data of partial HA sequences represents an argument that is well outside of scientific standards.

The frequent misinterpretation of sequence data in WHO reports raises serious issues that should be addressed by an independent analysis. 

These repeated errors by WHO and the CDC in interpretation of sequence data, in failed attempts to support the random mutation paradigm continue to be hazardous to the world’s health.

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